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Middle East Peace Talks at the 
End of the Road? 
One-State Reality Consolidating 
Muriel Asseburg 
The nine months of negotiations agreed last summer by the US mediators and the 
two parties ended on 29 April 2014. US Secretary of State John Kerry has since announced 
a pause in US facilitation activities. Yet, a definitive breakdown or failure of the Middle 
East peace talks bears far-reaching risks. Even if the mediators were to succeed in effect-
ing a restart of talks, there is scant hope of bridging the rifts within the year envisaged 
– at least if the previous approach were to be maintained. That will lead to a further 
consolidation of the one-state reality that has long since emerged between the Mediter-
ranean and River Jordan. Germany and its partners in the European Union must face 
up to the alternatives: either a much more robust approach to propel the talks to a two-
state solution, or insistence on equal political, economic and cultural rights for all in 
the territories controlled by Israel. 
 
The timeframe scheduled for conclusion 
of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement 
expired at the end of April. Despite US Sec-
retary of State John Kerry’s intense efforts, 
the talks made so little progress that by the 
end of 2013 he was concentrating primarily 
on achieving a prolongation. He first hoped 
to negotiate a framework agreement 
binding both parties to core principles for 
a peace settlement. But that could not be 
achieved by the approach he chose, as Kerry 
neither formulated such principles nor 
made concrete proposals for bridging the 
gaps between the positions. Instead he con-
centrated on sounding out the needs and 
priorities of the parties and presenting 
these to the respective other side. But that 
did not lead to rapprochement. Worse still, 
the parameters defined by President Bill 
Clinton at the end of 2000 (and largely ac-
cepted as a point of reference since) were 
watered down. In addition, the lack of clear 
parameters and demands allowed Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to 
place his demand for recognition of Israel 
as a Jewish state at the centre of the talks 
and the public debate, rather than nego-
tiating over the final status issues of the 
Oslo Accords (borders and legal status of 
Palestine, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees 
and security arrangements). 
 Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division and director of the project “Elite change and  SWP Comments 21 




 Talks in Crisis 
The conflicts finally burst into the open 
at the end of March 2014. In the scope of 
confidence-building measures agreed at the 
beginning of the talks in July 2013, Israel 
was to release 104 Palestinian prisoners 
imprisoned since before the Oslo Accords 
(in four stages), while the Palestinians 
promised to undertake no further action 
towards joining international conventions 
and organisations. Israel should have re-
leased the fourth and last group of Palestin-
ian prisoners on 29 March, but Netanyahu 
made this conditional on the Palestinians 
agreeing to a prolongation of the talks. A 
series of confrontational actions by both 
sides ensued: President Mahmoud Abbas 
signed fifteen international conventions 
and treaties, including the “State of Pales-
tine” joining the four Geneva conventions 
that regulate rights and obligations in mili-
tary conflict and under occupation regimes 
and are therefore of particular relevance 
to the Palestinian Territories. Israel an-
nounced the issuing of tenders for about 
seven hundred housing units in Gilo (East 
Jerusalem), suspended cooperation with 
Palestinian ministries (with the exception 
of the negotiations and security cooper-
ation), and declared its intention to once 
again withhold the transfer payments 
due to the Palestinian Authority (PA) under 
the Oslo Accords. Ramallah responded with 
reconciliation with Hamas. At the same 
time both sides remained concerned to 
signal to the United States that they were 
still keen to continue the talks, to improve 
their own negotiating position and blame 
the other side for the crisis. 
The negotiating process is indeed a tight-
rope walk for both leaderships. It is easier 
for them to continue it (at least in form if 
not in substance) than to make the “painful 
compromises” evoked so often or to break 
it off altogether. On the one hand, it is 
questionable whether Netanyahu wants 
substantial progress at all, as that would 
break apart his governing coalition and 
possibly even the Likud Party itself, as it 
would be rejected out of hand by Likud’s 
settler wing and Greater Israel ideologues 
and by some of its coalition partners (no-
tably Naftali Bennett’s HaBayit HaYehudi). 
President Abbas also lacks the support he 
would require to relinquish the “Palestin-
ian constants”: a state in the 1967 borders 
(or at least an equivalent), the right of 
return for refugees and a Palestinian capital 
in Jerusalem. Abbas’s mandate has long 
since expired (at the latest in 2010), and his 
engagement in the talks is eyed with great 
suspicion in the Palestinian population and 
in his own Fatah Party. Almost eighty years 
old, Abbas has been further weakened by 
political infighting within Fatah over the 
selection of a deputy and potential suc-
cessor. 
On the other hand, both leaderships 
fear that breaking off the talks could in-
crease international pressure on them, for 
example by lending weight to the inter-
national boycott movement against Israel 
or by endangering the financial basis of the 
extremely donor-dependent PA. However, 
for both leaderships continuing the process 
is the least worst option only as long as 
they can persuade their respective base that 
it does not harm them. For the Palestinian 
leadership this is extremely difficult in the 
face of unabated settlement construction. 
It remains uncertain therefore whether the 
US mediators can offer enough to persuade 
both parties to return to the negotiation 
table. 
Issues and Principles 
Even if the talks were to be extended by 
another year, it is extremely unlikely that 
the opposing sides would reach a final 
status agreement within that period. Their 
positions are miles apart on all final status 
issues and other questions – much further 
than in earlier talks, for example under 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008. In 
this situation, the American side has done 
even less than previous administrations to 
balance the power asymmetry between the 
parties by laying down firm principles. This 
has led to a blurring of the contours for a 
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 two-state settlement as formulated by Presi-
dent Barack Obama in his first address 
to the UN General Assembly in September 
2009 and presented to the UN Security 
Council in greater detail by the E3 (Ger-
many, France, United Kingdom) in February 
2011: a territorial solution on the basis of 
the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, 
security arrangements that satisfy the 
needs of both sides, a just solution to the 
refugee question agreed by both sides as 
well as the main host states, and Jerusalem 
as the capital of both states. The principal 
points of disagreement are as follows: 
Jerusalem: While the Palestinians claim 
East Jerusalem as their capital, the present 
Israeli government insists on a united Jeru-
salem under Israeli sovereignty. Under the 
Clinton parameters both capitals should be 
accommodated in Jerusalem, with the Arab 
quarters under Palestinian sovereignty, 
the Jewish under Israeli. According to press 
reports, Kerry favours a Palestinian capital 
in just one quarter of East Jerusalem. 
Territory/settlements: While Netanyahu 
accepted a two-state solution in principle in 
a widely noted speech at Bar-Ilan University 
in 2009, he also promised during the last 
election campaign that no settlements 
would be dissolved under his government. 
He has accelerated settlement construction 
and refuses to accept the 1967 borders as 
the basis for negotiations. Netanyahu also 
sprung a surprise demand that even settle-
ments far from the settlement blocks, such 
as Pesagot and Beit El on the outskirts of 
Ramallah, should remain part of Israel. 
According to press reports Kerry’s nego-
tiating team has not insisted on the 1967 
borders as the starting point for the talks. 
The Palestinians, on the other side, 
assume that their state will comprise all the 
Palestinian territories occupied in 1967: 
the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza 
Strip. Even these represent only about 22 
percent of the former British Mandate’s 
territory, whereas the 1947 UN Partition 
Plan proposed an Arab state accounting for 
about 43 percent of the territory. In that 
respect, the Palestinians assert, they have 
already made their historical compromise. 
Nonetheless, the Palestinian negotiators 
have accepted that there could be limited 
land swaps of equivalent size and quality 
so that some of the settlements on the Pales-
tinian side of the Green Line would go to 
Israel, while Palestine would receive land 
on the other side in return. But they make 
such swaps conditional on them not leading 
to further fragmentation of the Palestinian 
territory and on affected citizens agreeing 
to resettlement. 
Security arrangements: In earlier talks 
the Palestinians had already accepted that 
their state would not possess heavy weapon-
ry. It would also not have freedom to enter 
into military alliances and would tolerate 
Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley for a 
transitional period (three years under the 
Clinton parameters). But now Netanyahu 
has been insisting on a long-term Israeli 
military presence in the Jordan Valley, and 
has rejected Abbas’s suggestion to replace 
them with NATO forces. Israel also insists 
on the right of hot pursuit into Palestine 
in specific cases. Both of these conditions 
would mean the continuation of the Israeli 
military presence and operations and leave 
Palestine unable to protect its citizens 
against assaults. That, however, is unaccep-
table to the Palestinian side. 
Palestinian refugees: During the first 
Arab-Israeli war about three quarters of a 
million Palestinians fled or were displaced. 
Today the number of Palestinian refugees 
registered with the United Nations has 
grown to about five million. United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 194 of Decem-
ber 1948 grants them the right to return 
to their homes. In earlier negotiations the 
sides had already agreed that this would be 
accomplished largely through return to 
the State of Palestine and permanent settle-
ment in current host countries or in third 
countries (with the respective state’s agree-
ment), and only in exceptional cases through 
return to Israel. Additionally, Israel was to 
recognise its share of responsibility for the 
refugee problem and a fund was to be set 
up to pay compensation to refugees. While 
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 Prime Minister Olmert agreed to limited 
returns to Israel for humanitarian reasons 
and family reunification, Netanyahu strict-
ly rejects any return of refugees. 
Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state: 
In the course of the 1993 Oslo I Accord the 
PLO recognised the State of Israel and Israel 
recognised the PLO as the legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinians. The demand 
that the PA should recognize Israel as a 
Jewish state has been raised prominently 
only by Netanyahu. He has also used the 
debate over this to sow doubts about wheth-
er Palestinian negotiators were really nego-
tiating in good faith over a two-state settle-
ment in the sense of one state for the Pales-
tinians and one for the Jews. Leaving aside 
that the question of Jewish identity is 
also highly contested within Israel, the PA 
rejects the demand for several reasons. 
First, it is established practice under inter-
national law to recognise states as such, not 
their identity. Second, such a move could 
be interpreted as the PA approving the un-
equal treatment of the Palestinian Israelis 
(who make up about 20 percent of Israel’s 
population). And third it could be taken as 
a sign that the PA had renounced the right 
of return. If at all, therefore, Palestinian 
negotiators signal that recognition of Israel 
as the nation-state of the Jews could come 
only after, rather than before, the conclu-
sion of talks settling these issues. 
Consequences of Failure 
The hardening of positions and the widen-
ing of the gaps between the two sides means 
that failure of the talks, if they are to restart 
at all, is foreseeable sooner or later, at least 
if no new approach is adopted. The latter 
would have to involve concerted interna-
tional pressure to bind the parties to the 
basic principles of a solution, followed 
by intense mediation to clarify the details 
between the parties. An oversight mecha-
nism would have to be established to moni-
tor steps leading to a solution (as provided 
for but not implemented in the Middle East 
Quartet’s Roadmap of 2003), the role of the 
international community in peacekeeping 
concretised and the consequences of failure 
spelled out. The latter could, for example, 
mean freeing the way for an International 
Court of Justice legal opinion outlining a 
solution compatible with international law 
and its implementation by the UN Security 
Council. Admittedly, such a move (or a com-
parable one) cannot currently be expected 
from the United States. Not only does Con-
gress reject presenting binding principles 
and exerting greater pressure, with great 
unity across party lines in this question. 
Obama’s Administration is also under grow-
ing domestic pressure to turn its attention 
to other crises and problems rather than 
wasting yet more time on what are per-
ceived as futile talks. Accordingly, the US 
administration announced a pause in its 
efforts in early May. 
After more than twenty years of Oslo 
negotiations, large majorities in both popu-
lations would interpret failure of this round 
of talks as the failure of a negotiated solu-
tion per se. That would especially under-
mine and indeed fundamentally call into 
question the legitimacy of the PA, which 
was originally established to administer 
the Palestinian Territories for a transitional 
period (1994–1999), in which negotiations 
were to lead to liberation from occupation. 
That would also make it harder for the PA 
to cooperate with Israel to the extent is 
does today, for example in the sphere of 
security. 
A Third Intifada? 
An end of the talks would not, however, 
automatically lead to a third Intifada, in 
the sense of a renewed outburst of violence. 
In 2000 the Palestinian population still 
held high expectations of independent 
statehood and successful negotiations at 
Camp David, and the failure of those talks 
did therefore contribute to spark the second 
Intifada. But the most recent negotiations 
are followed largely with resignation. 
Surveys show that Palestinians (like their 
Israeli counterparts) have abandoned any 
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 hopes they may have placed in the talks. 
Failure is therefore likely to provoke 
no more than a shrugging of shoulder 
in most quarters. 
Also, Palestinian readiness to support an-
other uprising is likely to be much smaller 
than it was fourteen years ago. Not only is 
the second Intifada viewed much less as a 
success than the first one, but the Palestin-
ians are still suffering its consequences. 
Most painful is the loss of jobs in Israel and 
the settlements, where about one fifth of 
the Palestinian workforce was employed 
before the second uprising. What is more, 
the separation barrier de facto annexes 
about 8 percent of the West Bank and cuts 
East Jerusalem off from its Palestinian 
hinterland. Many Palestinians also worry 
about losing all they possess in any new 
protracted conflict with Israel, especially 
as private indebtedness has risen notice-
ably in recent years. 
Finally, the Palestinian leadership under 
President Abbas will also seek to prevent 
any renewed popular uprising. Abbas cat-
egorically rejects the use of violence and 
is hardly likely to call for mass protests. 
Although largely peaceful “popular resist-
ance” has gained traction in the popula-
tion, especially among the youth, the major 
movements of Hamas and Fatah have en-
couraged it only half-heartedly. In view of 
their falling popularity, both leaderships 
in Ramallah and Gaza City must fear that 
mass protests could quickly turn against 
them too. 
The End of the Palestinian Authority? 
Even the threat to disband the PA, voiced 
with increasing frequency by figures in-
cluding the President, appears more a help-
less warning than a seriously intended 
step. The Palestinian political and economic 
elites are hardly going to renounce the privi-
leges associated with a VIP status rooted 
in the Oslo Accords. The PA is also the re-
cipient of international donations and the 
biggest employer in the Palestinian terri-
tories. A considerable proportion of the 
population depends directly or indirectly 
on income from the public sector. Further-
more, while the PA has adapted its tactics 
increasingly to the given situation by pur-
suing other paths to independence along-
side (and in future possibly instead of) talks, 
there is no sign of it fundamentally aban-
doning the objective of independent state-
hood. Handing responsibility back to the 
occupying power would, however, 
contradict its efforts to achieve recognition 
of Palestine on the international stage. 
Yet, the collapse of the PA or at least a 
serious erosion of its ability to govern can 
by no means be ruled out. Israel is likely 
to respond with reprisals as soon as the 
Palestinian side takes any action it regards 
as confrontative. That would include offi-
cial support of the Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS) movement or any attempt 
to sign the statute of the International 
Criminal Court. Israel could then withhold 
transfer payments or completely seal off 
particular areas. Certain donors, first and 
foremost the United States, would probably 
also suspend their support, at least par-
tially. 
The rapprochement of the leaderships in 
Ramallah and Gaza and their 23 April 2014 
power-sharing agreement could entail simi-
lar consequences. While it is questionable 
whether important elements of the recon-
ciliation agreement, such as the holding of 
largely free elections including Hamas or 
the integration of the two security services, 
can actually be realised, the announcement 
itself was enough to cause Israel to threaten 
to quit the talks. If a technocratic consensus 
government is actually established, Israel is 
likely to stop its transfer payments. It is by 
no means clear either how the European 
Union and its member states would relate 
to and cooperate with such a government 
that included members of Hamas (which 
has been on the EU terrorist list since 2003) 
or refused to explicitly affirm the so-called 
Quartet criteria (recognition of Israel, 
recognition of earlier agreements signed 
between Israel and the PLO, renunciation 
of violence). This risks exacerbating the 
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 PA’s financial difficulties, stemming 
from growing donor fatigue, and thus 
further restricting its functioning and 
legitimacy. 
A recent study edited by Khalil Shikaki 
(Director of the Palestinian Centre for 
Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah) 
convincingly details the grave consequence 
of a collapse of the PA: The security situa-
tion in the West Bank would escalate dra-
matically and local militias would be re-
invigorated. There would also be a massive 
socio-economic slump and public services 
would deteriorate noticeably. 
Consolidation of a One-State Reality 
After the dissolution or collapse of the 
Palestinian Authority it would no longer be 
possible to ignore the fact that a one-state 
reality has long since emerged in the areas 
of the former British Mandate of Palestine. 
Although Israel actually annexed only part 
of the occupied Palestinian Territories, 
namely East Jerusalem, it exercises de facto 
far-reaching control over the entire territory 
and its population. 
The basis for this state of affairs was 
created by the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995, 
with the consent of the Palestinian leader-
ship, who at the time assumed that this was 
merely for a five-year transition period. The 
Accords basically restrict the competencies 
of the PA to self-administration and main-
taining internal order in the largely discon-
tiguous parts of Area A and Area B (enclaves 
representing today about 38 percent of the 
West Bank). For Area C (about 62 percent) 
the Accords provide far-reaching Israeli 
control, including public order, security, 
planning and approval for all construction. 
In this manner Israel divested itself of 
some of the responsibilities of an occupying 
power, while the international community 
took over funding. At the same time, the 
Oslo Accords also gave Israel interim con-
trol of land and sea borders and airspace 
(with the exception, since mid-2007, of the 
border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt). 
Not least, the Accords cemented Israeli 
domination over Jerusalem and over the 
Palestinian economy. 
Since Oslo, there has been a further 
entanglement of the populations – that 
must not be confused with a harmonious 
coexistence. Israel’s continued settlement 
construction in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, in violation of the Oslo Accords, 
and its withdrawal of the settlers from the 
Gaza Strip in 2005, have produced a com-
plex demographic pattern between the 
Mediterranean and the River Jordan, where 
inhabitants enjoy different rights (or are 
denied them) depending on citizenship, 
place of residence and ethnicity/religion. 
Already today there is no longer a Jewish 
majority in the region controlled by Israel, 
which is home to about 8 million Israelis 
(of whom some 6 million are Jewish, in-
cluding roughly 550,000 Jewish settlers in 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem), about 
4.4 million Palestinians and roughly 1.6 
million Palestinian Israelis. Indeed, the 
Jewish share of the population is set to 
decline, due to higher fertility among the 
Palestinians and because the waves of 
immigration seen in the 1990s are unlikely 
to be repeated. 
At the same time, since Oslo there has 
been no progress towards sustainable devel-
opment in the Palestinian Territories, an 
end to the occupation and the establish-
ment of two states. The considerable inter-
national investments in Palestinian govern-
ment institutions and the private sector 
have thus remained as ineffective as the 
recognition of Palestine as a “non-member 
observer state” by the UN General Assembly 
in November 2012. 
Instead the territory envisaged for a 
Palestinian state has become ever more frag-
mented through the construction of settle-
ments, settlement infrastructure and the 
separation barrier, the blockade of the Gaza 
Strip, a complex system of checkpoints, 
separate roads and travel permits, and the 
internal Palestinian split. The everyday lives 
of the Palestinians remain dominated by 
the occupation. 
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 Conflicts over Gaza and Jerusalem 
Other festering conflicts threaten an already 
fragile stability. The cease-fire between the 
Hamas government and Israel, mediated 
by Egypt after the last round of fighting 
in 2012, has been increasingly eroded in 
recent months. There is an acute danger 
that a miscalculation by one or other side 
could set in motion a renewed military 
escalation. In fact since Oslo the periods 
between armed conflicts involving the Gaza 
Strip have been short (2002, 2006, 2008/09, 
2012) and reprisal strikes have become 
routine. 
Also, the situation in the Gaza Strip, 
which has been under Israeli blockade since 
2006 (even if it has been slightly eased in 
the interim), has worsened further since 
the military coup in Egypt in July 2013. 
After the coup Hamas was declared a terror 
organisation in Egypt, the Rafah border 
crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt 
has been almost permanently closed, and 
most of the tunnels under the border have 
been destroyed. As a result, the humani-
tarian situation in Gaza has drastically 
worsened, the economy has collapsed and 
the population has lost its last physical 
connection to the outside world. The Hamas 
government has also lost its main source 
of revenue, which was the licensing and 
taxation of trade through the tunnels. As 
a consequence, it can no longer pay wages 
and salaries in full, making most of the 
Strip’s population once more dependent 
on international humanitarian aid. The 
suffering is heightened by funding prob-
lems at the UN relief agency UNRWA, 
which has already had to scale down its 
services to refugees and poor families. 
In an unpublished March 2014 report, 
EU member states’ representatives paint 
a dramatic picture of the situation in East 
Jerusalem, warning urgently of an esca-
lation of the dispute over the holy sites. 
Radical Jewish groups are attempting to 
alter the status quo at the al-Aqsa Com-
pound or Temple Mount, where a demon-
strative visit by opposition leader Ariel 
Sharon in 2000 triggered the second Inti-
fada. But the situation in East Jerusalem as 
a whole is explosive as Israel has massively 
expanded its settlement activities there 
since the resumption of negotiations in July 
2013. Additionally, there is discrimination 
in provision of public services and construc-
tion permits, and Palestinian homes built 
without permits have increasingly been 
demolished. 
Conclusions 
Even if there were a return to negotiations, 
they cannot be expected to produce a two-
state settlement – with the result of a fur-
ther entrenchment of the one-state reality. 
Germany and its European partners should 
face up to the alternatives: Either there 
must be robust negotiations based on clear 
international principles to still achieve a 
two-state solution after all. Or ways must 
be found to deal with the one-state reality 
without tolerating violations of inter-
national law or accepting that “might is 
right”. There is no sense in speculating 
about the point of no return from when a 
two-state settlement would no longer be 
possible. After all, housing and infrastruc-
ture can be dismantled or used by other 
population groups. But the political and 
material costs for a change of course rise 
with every new settlement unit constructed 
in the occupied territories. 
It would be sensible for the EU member-
states to follow two guiding principles. First 
they should work to prevent crises such as 
the complete or partial collapse of the PA 
(for example as a consequence of Israeli re-
actions to the formation of a national con-
sensus government) and renewed outbreaks 
of violence, for example in Gaza or Jeru-
salem. Second they should seriously consider 
whether they are willing and able to per-
suade the United States to adopt a consider-
ably more robust approach to the negotia-
tions. The alternative is unpalatable to all 
sides. With a vast majority of both popu-
lations, and Jewish Israelis in particular, 
rejecting a one-state settlement, that 
approach is unlikely to lead to a consensual 
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 solution. Still, in the absence of progress 
towards two states, the division of respon-
sibilities between Israel and the PA agreed 
in Oslo and the associated assumption of 
most of the costs by the international com-
munity will have to be questioned. And 
instead of continuing to pursue the support 
of Palestinian statehood, Europe will then 
have to demand equal political, economic 
and cultural rights for all inhabitants of the 
territory controlled by Israel. 
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